Abstract. The existence of a Nash equilibrium feedback is established for a two-player nonzerosum stochastic differential game with discontinuous feedback. This is obtained by studying a parabolic system strongly coupled by discontinuous terms.
1.
Introduction. The aim of this paper is to study the existence of Nash equilibrium points for a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game. The game is governed by a stochastic differential equation with two controls and two payoffs.
This problem can be found, for instance, in Friedman [7] and in a series of papers by Bensoussan and Frehse [2] , [3] , [4] . All these papers make the assumption that feedback is continuous.
We are interested in studying the problem assuming that the controls take values in compact sets. In this case one cannot expect a Nash equilibrium among continuous feedback, and the Hamiltonian functions associated with the game are nonsmooth.
We consider a simple multidimensional model problem taking two players, affine dynamics, affine payoff functions, and compact control sets.
The loss of continuity of the feedback, due to the hard constraints, leads us to consider a parabolic system strongly coupled by discontinuous terms. In fact, from the usual necessary condition satisfied by the value of the Nash equilibrium feedback in terms of the Hamilton-Jacobi theory, we reduce ourselves to studying the existence of a sufficiently regular solution to a system of nonlinear parabolic equations which contains the Heaviside graph. By this regularity result, we are able to construct Nash equilibrium feedback whose optimality is proved by using the verification approach in the sense of [2] , [3] , [4] .
The motivation for studying games in compact control sets comes from standard nonlinear control theory; this seems a natural assumption in many applications. In particular, Nash equilibria for nonzero-sum deterministic differential games were recently studied by Olsder [12] and Cardaliaguet and Plaskacz [5] .
Statement of the problem.
Let Ω be a bounded smooth domain in R N . Let X be a process which satisfies the following stochastic differential equation
For each s, X(s) represents the state evolution of a system controlled by two players. The ith player acts by means of a feedback control function
, be the set of the control functions u i with values u i (s, X) in U i . The term σ(s, X(s))dw represents the "noise," where w is an N -dimensional standard Brownian motion and σ is an N × N matrix. We assume that σ does not depend on the control variables u 1 , u 2 and that σ and σ −1 are bounded and Lipschitz on X. The function f (s, X, u 1 , u 2 ) is called the dynamic of the game (2.1).
We refer to [7] for the definitions about stochastic processes, stochastic differential equations and functional spaces.
A control function u i ∈ U i will be called admissible if it is adapted to the filtration defined on the probability space.
It is possible to prove, using Girsanov's theorem, that, under convenient assumptions on f , for all (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 admissible controls, there exists a unique weak solution to the problem (2.1), (2.2) (see, for example, [4] , [9] , [6, Chapter 4] ).
For any choice of admissible controls u 1 , u 2 we have the following payoff functions:
∈ Ω}, E tx is the expectation under the probability P tx , l i and g i are prescribed functions (the assumptions will be specified later), and X = X(s) is the unique weak solution of (2.1)-(2.2) corresponding to (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 ×U 2 admissible controls.
Each player wants to maximize his own payoff. 
The functions
are a value of the Nash equilibrium point (u 1 , u 2 ).
We define the pre-Hamiltonians
We set a = 1 2 σσ * (σ * is the transpose of σ) to be the matrix with elements a h,k , h, k = 1, . . . , N.
If the value functions V 1 , V 2 ∈ C 1,2 , we can apply Itô's formula; changing the time variable (T − t → t), we get that V 1 , V 2 solve, in Ω T :≡ (0, T ) × Ω, the following nonlinear parabolic system coupled by the Nash equilibrium problem:
where
Here and in the following we write, for the sake of brevity, argmax ui∈Ui H i , which means argmax ui(t,x)∈Ui H i ).
are called the Hamiltonian functions associated with the game (2.1)-(2.3).
We want to outline here the classical procedure used in Friedman's book [7] to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium point u 1 , u 2 .
1. Suppose that, for any fixed p ∈ R N , there exist u *
2. Solve the parabolic system
3. Prove that the pair of functions (u 1 , u 2 ) with values
is a Nash equilibrium point (see Definition 2.1).
Therefore to obtain Nash equilibrium points for the associated stochastic differential game, we look for a "sufficiently regular" solution of system (2.14).
A similar procedure is used, in the elliptic case, by Bensoussan and J. Frehse [2] , [3] , [4] to study systems of Bellman equations.
We want to emphasize that the results of Friedman and Bensoussan and J. Frehse on the existence of classical solutions and of Nash equilibrium points are obtained under the assumption that there exist some feedback
that are continuous in p (see, for example, assumption (D) [7, section 17, p. 497]). If we assume that the sets U i , i = 1, 2, are compact, the assumption on the continuity of the feedback can be too restrictive.
Weaker assumptions on the regularity of the feedback can be found in [8] and [9] . In this paper we consider a model problem with U 1 , U 2 compact sets in R, affine dynamics of the game, and affine payoff.
Let us list the assumptions:
Taking into account the affine structure of f and l in (2.16)-(2.17), the functions H 1 and H 2 in (2.7) become Analogously
From (2.20), (2.21), (2.22), the Hamiltonian functions assume the form
where we denoted by (h) + the positive part of the function h.
Taking, for any fixed p,
we have that u * 1 , u * 2 do not satisfy (2.13) because they are not continuous in p. Hence, in this case, we cannot use the results of [7] .
From (2.25), (2.26), the parabolic system (2.8), (2.9) becomes
This is a uniformly parabolic system strongly coupled by the Heaviside graph containing the first order derivatives of the unknown functions.
Equations (2.27) and (2.28) are to be interpreted in the following way:
Following the previous scheme, first we investigate the existence of a solution V 1 , V 2 of (2.27)-(2.29). Next, if we find sufficient regularity, it will be possible to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium point. In section 3 we provide an existence result for a solution
q (Ω T ) of the system (2.27)-(2.29), and in section 4 we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium point.
3. Existence of a solution to the parabolic system. We give the following definition.
Definition 3.1. Proof. Let us consider the approximating problems obtained by replacing the Heaviside graph Heav(η) with smooth functions H n :
We denote by V 1n , V 2n the solution of the problem
From [11, Theorem 7.1, p. 596] on quasi-linear parabolic systems with smooth coefficients, there exists an unique solution of problem (3.2)
At this point, regarding the terms .2) 
where C is independent of n and q > 1.
By means of an embedding theorem (see, for example, [11, Chapter 2, Lemma 3.3]), taking q > N + 2, we obtain
where C is independent of n.
We can now extract two subsequences, which we denote again by V 1n , V 2n such that
From the weak precompactness of the unit ball of W 2,1 q , we have
From (3.7), (3.8)
Now we have to prove that V 1 , V 2 solve (2.27)-(2.28) almost everywhere in Ω T .
From assumptions (3.1) and (3.8), the two sequences
, and hence we can extract two subsequences such that
To do this let us consider the following sets:
From (3.7), we have that, for a sufficiently large n,
Hence, from (3.1), we obtain that
and hence
In Z i , from the assumptions on H n (see (3.1)), we have that 0 ≤ h i ≤ 1 almost everywhere, and hence
At this point, from (3.7), (3.8), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12) , we obtain that V 1 , V 2 satisfy (2.27)-(2.28) almost everywhere in Ω T and from the regularity of the functions V 1 ,
Remark 3.1. If we choose W (η) ∈ Heav(η), we are not able to solve the problem
because we cannot exclude that meas{(t,
. Hence we cannot prove that
but only that
4. Existence of a Nash equilibrium point. We now prove the following. 
is a Nash equilibrium point for the stochastic differential game (2.1)-(2.2) with payoff (2.3).
Proof. The existence of a strong solution (V 1 , V 2 ) of the parabolic system (2.27)-(2.29) is stated by Theorem 3.2.
To prove that
are the values of a Nash equilibrium point, as in Definition 2.1, we have to show that
Let us denote 2 ) solves the following parabolic system (here and in the following we omit, for the sake of brevity, the dependence on the variables (t, x)):
From (4.1), (4.2), we have
Let us now fix (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 admissible controls and denote
The couple (w 1 , w 2 ) solves the following parabolic system:
From the expressions (2.20) of H 1 , H 2 , taking into account (2.10), (2.11), we have that, for any p fixed, 
Taking into account (4.14), we obtain Taking into account (4.4) and (4.10), from (4.18) we obtain (4.3), i.e., the result.
Remark 4.1. The results proved in section 3 and 4 hold true even if we take M > 2 players and if we take the functions f and l linear and dependent explicitly on t, i.e., f (t, x, u 1 , u 2 ) = f 1 (t, x)u 1 + f 2 (t, x)u 2 + f 3 (t, x), l 1 (t, x, u 1 , u 2 ) = l 1 (t, x)u 1 + h 1 (t, x), l 2 (t, x, u 1 , u 2 ) = l 2 (t, x)u 2 + h 2 (t, x).
The only difference is the appearance in (2.27)-(2.28), as source terms, of the functions f 3 (t, x) + h 1 (t, x) and f 3 (t, x) + h 2 (t, x), respectively.
